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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
~CLARENCE

B. LAMBERT,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
JERRRY SINE and DORA SINE,
doing business under the name and
style of Se Rancho Motor Lodge
and Tourist Apartments,

Case No. 7572

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The statement of facts in the appellants' brief
appears accurate. The record indicates, however, that
each side viewed much of the evidence differently, that
the statements of certain witnesses were diametrically
opposed. This conflict in the testimony is not developed in the appellants' statement of the facts, but
instead, the court is led to believe that certain testimony tending to bolster appellants' theories of the
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case is clear and uncontroverted. For this reason,
and because respondent desires to correct what he
considers some erroneous statements, he restates many
of the facts.
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Clarence B. Lambert, born in Utah and a resident
of Salt Lake City, is the respondent. On the 2d of
January, 1950, the respondent, accompanied by his
brother, Charles Lambert, and a mutual friend, Donald
E. Moore, were looking for a place to live (R. 5, 7,
28, 41). Both Clarence Lambert and his brother,
~Charles, had been living in their mother's house in
Salt Lake City. Charles Lambert was unemployed.
The respondent also was unemployed, going to work
for a contractor, John Oliphant, in February, 1950
(R. 53 and 59). Mr. Moore had been living with his
brother in Salt Lake City, where he had been paying
for his room and board (R. 38 and 43). At this
time Mr. Moore was employed by the Denver & Rio
Grande Railroad (R. 38).
On the evening of January 2, 1950, the respondent,
his brother, and Mr. Moore went to appellants' motor
lodge on North Temple. Charles Lambert explained
that the Se Rancho Motor Lodge and Tourist Apartments were selected for the reason that it was close
to where Mr. Moore was employed (R. 15). Mrs.
Sine, one of the appellants and joint owner with her
husband of the motor lodge was on duty (R. 51).
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Mrs. Sine asked the group several questions. She
wanted to know where they were from and how long
they intended to stay at her motor lodge (R. 16).
Mrs. Sine told the group that she did not want to
rent one of her apartments to them if they were
just going to stay for a short length of time (R. 17,
45 and 51). It was decided that the respondent, his
brother, and Mr. Moore would occupy Apartment 107.
The conversation was concluded after a discussion as
to what the rent of 107 would be. On this subject,
the testimony is in conflict. At the trial no one remembered with any degree of certainty just what was
decided (R. 34, 4·6 and 101). In any event, neither
the Lamberts nor Mr. Moore had any money that
evening, and before moving into the apartment, Mrs.
Sine took a suit from Charles Lambert as security
(R. 17, 36 and 101).
The appellants' description of Apartment No. 107
is essentially correct; however, the respondent can
hardly agree with the statement that "the third roon1
was a small kitchen or kitchenette", when it consisted
of a stove, ice box, chairs and table, and eontained
sufficient space for eating (R. 18 and 81).
In their statement of facts, the appellants assert
that "some house cleaning service was performed".
On this point the evidence is again clearly in conflict.
Charles Lambert testified that he, his brother and
Mr. Moore kept the apartment clean and made the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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·beds ( R. 19 and 20). On the other hand, Mrs. Sine
testified that she had at one time scrubbed the floor
of the respondent's apartment (R. 103).
On March 15, 1950, at approximately 7:30p.m., the
respondent discovered that he was locked out of his
apartment. He was informed by Mrs. Sine that he
was locked out for past due rent and was told that
he owed a sum of about $73.00 (R. 54-55 and 110).
The respondent felt that this amount was excessive.
Mrs. Sine declined to discuss the matter further, tell·ing the reS'pondent that her husband had retired and
could not be disturbed (R. 54 and 108). The respondent left and went to a hotel (R. 55). Later that same
evening, the respondent called a friend, Walter A..
Stroud, and Mr. Stroud met the respondent at the
motor lodge where he talked with Mrs. Sine (R. 55
and 68). Mrs. Sine again repeated that the amount
owing by the respondent was in excess of $70.00 (R.
69). The respondent spent the night of March 15th
at the hotel, and the next day moved into his mother's
house, where because of the crowded conditions he
slept on the floor (R. 58).
Later that same week the respondent made an
offer to pay Mrs. Sine an amount between $50.00 and
$60.00. This was refused (R. 65). On the 16th, the
respondent returned to the motor lodge early in the
morning and was allowed to get some working clothes
(R. 57 and 108). The remainder of the appellants'
statement of facts appears correct, with the exception
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of the erroneous assertion that no amount was awarded
as actual damages. And further, that the court held
that appellants had a lien on the personal property
of the respondent for the unpaid charges. The
court discusses the problem of the lien but says : ''As
to that particular point, I am not going to decide
it" (R. 126).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT'S RULING THAT THE RELATION OF THE
APPELLANTS TO THE RESPONDENT WAS THAT OF
LANDLORD AND TENANT SHOULD BE UPHELD.

There is no argument that ordinarily an establishment like the Se Rancho Motor Lodge and Tourist
Apartments, which is usually referred to by the public as a motor lodge, motel, or motor court, caters
principally to transients and travellers who prefer
their automobile to other modes of transportation, and
who enjoy motels to the more formal atmosphere of
the standard hotel. However, it is the respondent's
theory that what these appellants ordinarily do cannot
be used to screen other activities or to hide the fact
that these appellants do at times, and in fact did in
this instance, use their establishment to create a relationship different from that created with a traveller.
In Cedar Rapids Investment Company v. Commodore Hotel Company (Iowa, 1928), 218 NW 510, 56
A.L.R. 1098, 145 A.L.R. 363, the court said :
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''The same building may undoubtedly be
operated as an inn and rooming house, eating
house, and apartment house as a single institution and under the same management. Such
operation, however, would not make the relationship between proprietor and all of the occupants of the house of the one class either
guests, roomers or tenants. The defendants
relationship with some of them might be that
of innkeeper and guest, and with others landlords and tenants.''
The first problem then that faces us is to determine whether the trial court's finding that the relationship between these appellants and the res·pondent
was that of landlord and tenant is correct (R. 8). In
considering this point, the California court in Roberts
v. Casey, 37 Cal. App. (2d Supp.) 767, 93 P(2) 654,
at page 658, says :
''Though we treat the question, however, not
as one of fact merely but as one of mixed law
and fact, it is still clear that an appellate tribunal is only justified in overruling the view
taken by a trial court if the factors that enter
into the relation, and mark it as of the character opposite to that found by the lower
Court, so dominate the situation as to clearly
nullify the effect of the factors opposed to
them. Otherwise the question is to be dete!'mined as one of fact as to which the judgment
of the trial Court must be treated as concluding the matter."
It appears to the respondent that the trial court's
finding of fact No. 4 is clearly borne out by the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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record. Let us follow events chronologically. The
first incident was the meeting on the evening of
January 2, 1950, between the Lamberts and Mr. Moore
with ~Irs. Sine in the office of the Se Rancho Motor
Lodge and Tourist Apartments. At this time apparently a rather lengthy conversation took place. Tliree
points were discussed:
1. The type of unit that was to be engaged (R.
16 and 51).
2. The length of time said unit was to be occupied (R. 16, 45 and 51).
3. The amount of money it was to cost and how
frequently it was to be ·paid (R. 18, 34, 45, 46 and 51).
Each of these three points is of interest. In this
conversation we have the first sign of what type of
relationship was contemplated. What type of accommodations were the Lamberts and Mr. Moore looking
for 1 1frs. Sine showed the group pictures of the
type of units she had available. Most of them were
rejected. They were looking for a place with a kitchen.
They wanted to do their own cooking. That way it
would be cheaper (R. 16 and 51). When M;rs. Sine
showed them a ·picture of apartment 107, with a
kitchen, they decided to take it. There would be few
transients who would take such care at 7 :30 in the
evening selecting a place to stay.
careful.

These men were

They were not looking for just a place to
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sleep, a cheap hole-in-the-wall where they could throw
their hats; they wanted more than that. They wanted
a place they could call home for several months, perhaps for longer.

;a

:~~
~J

Second, how long were they going to stay T Mrs.
Sine made it quite clear that she had no intention
of renting to them unless they planned on remaining
for some time (R. 17). Charles La~bert remembered
''she did not want to rent the apartment to us just
for a week or two weeks. She wanted to rent it to
us for a period of time". He replied that they
"intended on being there for a period of time" (R.
51). Is this the way an innkeeper speaks to his guests T
No! Mrs. Sine asked other questions (R. 16). Her
intent is clear. This appellant who now cries for
her innkeeper's lien, 52-2-2, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, was careful on that night in January, 1950, to
make certain that she was not renting to transients,
tourists or travellers. This is not the situation where
the guest remains for a long period of time and then
claims to be a tenant. New Southern Hotel Company
v. Kingston (Ohio, 193'6), 72 NE(2) 782.
In the instant case, the appellant, Dora Sine,
insisted before she would consider renting to the respondent, his brother and Mr. Moore that the three of
them agree to stay :at her establishment for quite
some period of time. Mrs. Sine wanted tenants, not
guests. In their brief, the appellants put emphasis
on Exhibit 1, which is a card entitled, "Guest RegisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tration ". This is a printed form. Its title has no
application to the facts of this case. An examination
of Exhibit 1 indicates that the respondent and his
friends either did not own an automobile, or Mrs.
Sine did not think it necessary under the circumstances to record information concerning one on the
card. Appellant's attorney, in cross-examining Charles
Lambert, made clear that this motor lodge was "designed for easy access to the travelling public by
motor vehicle". Here again, respondent points out
that Mrs. Sine knew she was not nor did she want to
deal in this instant case with members of the ''travelling public". Exhibit 1 has another purpose besides
the mere registering of persons staying at the motor
lodge. Turn it over and look at the back. It now
becomes apparent that Exhibit 1 is a ledger card
used by these appellants for keeping record of · the
charges and credits of occupants of the motor lodge.
This fact and the conversation between Mrs. Sine
and the respondent set out above nullify any significance that might otherwise be attached to the printed
title of Exhibit 1.
The third and last topic discussed during that
conversation on January 2d was the amount of money
Mrs. Sine wanted for apartment 107 and how often
it should be paid. The writer has already pointed
out in his statement of facts that none of the witnesses
for either side could remember with certainty just
what was said on this point. In the court's finding of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fact No. 2 (R. 7), this conflict was resolved in favor
of respondent. Respondent believes that this finding
is sustained by the following facts :
a. During the conversation, Mr. Moore remembered telling Mrs. Sine that "I would have to pay
her every two weeks, because that is when I receive
my pay * * * the lOth and the 25th, and she agreed
to that" (R. 45).
h. Mrs. Sine remembered the boys ''would only
be paid twice a month" (R. 102).
c. Both Exhibit "A" and Exhibit 1 show that
$42.00 was paid on the lOth and 25th of each month.
These dates correspond with Mr. Moore's paydays.
An examination of Exhibit "A" and Exhibit 1
reveals that though no amount less than $42.00 was
ever paid, some attempt by these appellants has been
made to make it look as though the $42.00 was to
be divided into weekly payments. This is no more
than an artful plan to juggle the facts in order to
demonstrate that the respondent was paying his rent
on a weekly basis, and as such should be disregarded
by the court. The respondent feels that the above
facts indicate that he was not paying a weekly rental.
However, the respondent is confident that should the
court find that he was paying a weekly rental, such
fact would still be a strong indication that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In State v. Bowman (Minn., 1938), 279 NW 214,
the court said:
"It is difficult to see how any other determination could be reached. The record indicates
that the agreement was based upon the payment
of a weekly rental for the use and occupation
of some part of defendant's premises.''
On petition for rehearing, the court said:
"Whether the relation of landlord and tenant existed was a fact question which the trial
court resolved against the defendant.''
The rehearing was denied. In this case the defendant owned and operated a building known as
the Oriole Apartment Hotel. W. C. Keller rented a
room and bath for himself and his wife. When they
took possession the only furniture the Kellers possessed was a radio and radio table. The balance
of the furniture necessary to get :along with was
provided by defendant except as to a few additional
articles later acquired by the Kellers. On December
26, 1936, Keller owed in back rent $76.00, and defendant, in Keller's absence, locked up the room and prevented Keller from re-entering or removing their
clothes and personal belongings unless they paid the
back rental.
In Murray v. Hagens (La., 1932), 143 So. 505,
145 A.L.R. 365, ·plaintiffs were considered tenants by
the court. Plaintiffs had rented two rooms in the
wing of defendant's hotel at a specified amount per
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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week and that these rooms were used for light housekeeping, and that no maid service was furnished in
connection with them.
Following the conversation in the office, the Lamberts and Mr. Moore moved into apartment 107.
Charles Lambert in his testimony describes the condition of the apartment that first night as being
"pretty messy, the whole place" (R. 20). He further
testified as to who cleaned the apartment, "We did"
(R. 19). To the respondent this seems inconsistent
with ,an innkeeper and guest relationship. On cros8examination Charles Lambert testified as follows:

"Q. During the time that you were there,
you obtained clean linens from the office weekly, did you~

A. Yes.
Q. .Some of the time, the motor court put
the linens on your beds ~

A.

No, we went down and got them.

Q. Some of the time, didn't the motor
court put the linens on your beds~
A.

No, we went down and got them.

Q. In every
A.

case~

Yes.

Q. While you were there, the motor court
cleaned your apartment several times~
A.

No.

Q. Didn't

they~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
A. No.
Q. If they did, you didn't notice it, is
that it!
A. I know they didn't becauseQ. Were you there all the

time~

A. Yes.

Q. You never left the motor court'
A. I was drawing unemployment and I
was there during the day. I know what went
on because I done it.''
In Murray v. Hagens, supra, the court pointed
out in finding that a landlord and tenant relationship
existed that these rooms were used for "light housekeeping'', and that no maid service was furnished in
connection with them.
In Leon v. Kitchen Bros. Hotel Company (Neb.,
1938), 134 Neb. 137, 277 NW 823, 145 A.L.R. 364,
the court found that plaintiff was a guest, despite the
fact that plaintiff had lived in the hotel two years.
However, the court emphasized the fact that the only
difference between plaintiff and other patrons of the
defendant was the fact that he was charged and
paid by the month, other\vise he was furnished the
same services and accommodations as transient patrons.
The next point to consider is the type of unit
the respondent occupied. It was one of the largest
units at the appellants' motor court (R. 113). It had
a full-sized kitchen with a table that could be opened
to allow the occupants to eat in the kitchen (R. 81).
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There were also two bedrooms and a bath. Unlike the
defendant in Vaughn v. Neal, cited by these appellants at page 10 of their brief, this respondent occupied a self-contained unit exclusively for his own use.
In Va;ughn v. Neal, the defendant had only a sleeping
room. There was no private bath and no kitchen as
such, the defendant using an alcove for cooking.
In this case, apartment 107 contained several
basic pieces of furniture, adequate to supply the
needs of the usual guest. However, while these men
occupied the apartment, they found it necessary to
make certain purchases (R. 33 and 34). On this point
Donald Moore testified as follows :

'' Q. Now, in connection with using this
unit, did you purchase any items for use in the,
in this apartment~
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Are you the one that purchased those

items~

A. Yes, I bought glasses and silverware
and cups and saucers and dishes from the
Cashis King, right there at the side of it."
The respondent also testified that at one time
he had a radio in the unit (R. 118). Such conduct
strongly suggests a tenancy. The respondent agrees
that the appellants furnished utilities, supplied garbage receptacle, and that employes of the motel possessed keys to their apartment.
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In Fudge v. Downing (Utah, 1933), 83 U. 101,
27 P(2) 33, the court found that the rel,ationship of
landlord and tenant existed, the court finding in favor
of the plaintiff. In that case, plaintiff was occupying
a unit or apartment similar to the one here under
discussion. It consisted of a living room, kitchen and
private bath. It was furnished with linen, dishes,
silverware, cooking utensils, frigidaire, and furniture
for household keeping. The plaintiff moved into this
apartment with only a radio, various articles of
clothing, cooking utensils, bedding, etc. Though our
Supreme Court does not mention utilities, garbage
disposal, or maintenance work, the writer feels it is
safe to comment that such items were ;properly furnished in the Downing Apartments, and also that
Bessie Downing had a passkey.
The appellants in support of their case cite
Noblit v. Blickshire, 93 Cal. App. (2) 864, 210 P(2)
43. The respondent, after reading the case, is unable
to see how it is applicable to the instant case. In
the N oblit case, the court made no finding as to the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant,
but the court probably felt that the relationship between the parties was innkeeper and guest, and, such
·being the case, the plaintiff had no cause of action.
The appellants in their brief conclude that if under
these circumstances a motel operator is a landlord,
he is virtually without a remedy against an occupant
who fails to pay his rent. This is not true, for as a
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landlord he has recourse to 52-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. The motel operator as landlord is, for
practical purposes, in the same position as the OpBrator of a furnished apartment. The appellants herein
are in the same position as the defendant in Fudge v.
Downing, supra, where the court found a landlord and
tenant relationship.
This court must not become confused by the fact
that appellants usually operate their establishment to
accommodate transients. The appellants would "like
to have their cake and eat it, too". They want the
privilege of renting units to persons who agree to
remain for a long time, and who, while they remain
at the motel, are making it their home, thus assuring
themselves of occupied units and a steady flow of
rentals. The appellants want this advantage without
losing any of the statutory protection reserved for
the innkeeper, who is dealing with transients, travellers, and tourists.
Appellants contend that as a practical matter
104-60-3(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, requires that
a weekly rental paid be not considered a landlord and
tenant relationship. This statement is inconsistent with
the appellants' previous statement found in the second
full paragraph on page 13 of their brief. Nor do
the appellants support this statement with any cases.
A review of the cases cited by the appellants in their

brief indicates that in no instance does any court
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even suggest that a landlord and tenant relationship
will depend alone on the length of time elapsing
between rental periods.
The appellants, at page 17 of their brief, state
that the trial judge gave them the benefit of the innkeeper's lien. This is not so. The trial judge discussed this point, mused over it for a moment or
two before realizing the inconsistency of such a holding with a landlord and tenant relationship and said:
"At least I am going to say that, as to that
particular point, I am not going to decide it" (R. 126).
The intent of the parties, the facts in the record, and
the law applicable to the circumstances reveal that
there existed between the respondent and these appellants the relationship of landlord and tenant.
POINT II.
WHERE THE WRONGFUL ACT CONSTITUTES AN
INFRINGEMENT OF A LEGAL RIGHT, IT IS PROPER TO
ALLOW DAMAGES FOR MENTAL ANGUISH AND HUMILIATION, WHERE THEY ARE THE DIRECT, PROXIMATE
AND NATURAL RESULTS OF THE WRONGFUL ACT.

The appellants argue that it was error to award
damages for mental anguish and humiliation where
there was no wilful or malicious wrong and no award
of actual damages. In discussing this point, they
assume that the relation between the parties was that
of landlord and tenant, and that the appellants wrongfully locked the respondent out of his motel unit. We
do not here suggest that the mental suffering and
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great embarrassment and humiliation caused this respondent in themselves constitute a cause of action
against the appellants. This controversy involves the
right of the appellants to evict the respondent from
his apartment and claim a lien on his personal property. If the acts of the appellants were wrongful, as
assumed by the appellants, then a cause of action
exists in favor of the respondent, and courts have
always considered mental suffering 'and humiliation,
when the natural and proximate consequences of the
act complained of, as an element of damages.
A very clear statement of the rule applicable to
a recovery for mental suffering and humiliation is
found in Larson v. Chase (Mii:m., 1891), 47 Minn. 307,
50 NW 238, 14 L.R.A. 85. This case is quoted with
approval in 23 A.L.R. 361, at 363, under the annotation, ''Damages; right to recover for mental pain and
anguish alone, apart from other damages''. Although
that action involved a wilful injury, the language
used is applicable generally. It is as follows:
"There have been a great deal of Jllisconception and confusion as to when, if ever, mental suffering, as a distinct element of damage,
is a subject for compensation. This has frequently resulted from the courts giving a wrong
reason for a correct conclusion, that in a given
case no recovery could be had for mental suffering, placing it on the ground that mental suffering, as a distinct element of damage, is never
a proper subject of compensation, when the'
correct ground was that the act complained of
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was not an infraction of any legal right, and
hence not an actionable wrong at all, or else
that the mental suffering was not the direct
and ·proximate effect of the wrongful act * * *
Where the wrongful act constitutes an infringement on a legal right, mental suffering may be
recovered for, if it is the direct, proximate,
and natural result of the wrongful act * * *
Wherever the act complained of constitutes a
violation of some legal right of the plaintiff
which always in contemplation of law cause
injury, he is entitled to recover all damages
which are the proximate and natural consequences of the wrongful act''.

Burford v. Crause (D.C., 1950), 89 Fed. Supp.
818, is the first case cited by the appellants in support
of this point. This is a case from the trial court of
the District of Columbia. The plaintiff was suing for
compensatory and punitive damages for an alleged
unlawful eviction. The facts are that the defendant,
after expiration of a lease, and with prior written
notice of his intention to do so, as well as affording
the plaintiff tenant several extensions, apparently to
permit him time to remove his effects from the apartment, broke a lock and reentered. The court held that
the evidence did not amount to a showing of legal
damages compensable under the law. Wrote Judge
Kirkland:
''To successfully maintain a suit under the
theory of this complaint, the plaintiff must
show an injury to a legal right and that damages flowed as a result".
The verdict was directed for the defendant.
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In Cochrane v. Tuttle, 75 Ill. 361, the court after
considering the evidence was unable to determine
exactly what the relationship of the parties was. A
reading of the case indicates that the court felt that
the plaintiff suffered no legal damage under any
theory of the evidence, and for that reason the jury's
verdict was considered entirely out of reason.
These two cases cited by the appellants are the
type recognized in the Larson case as giving a right
conclusion for a wrong reason.
In Toler v. Cassinelli (W.Va., 1946), 129 W.Va.
591, 41 SE ( 2) 672, the court reversed the trial court
and sent the case back for a new trial because of a
failure of the jury to bring in a proper verdict. Said
the court:
''The finding actually made by the jury embraces only punitive damages * * * Plaintiff
cannot maintain an action merely to recover
punitive or exemplary damages",
but this court does not deny that humiliation and
mental pain may be considered as elements of damage,
for the court said:
"Where unreasonable and wilful action by
the defendant inflicts indignity, humiliation and
insult on the plaintiff, resulting in mental pain
and suffering, they are a just basis for compensatory damages''.
Judge Kenna, who wrote a concurring opinion, stated
the essence of this case when he said :
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''The jury reported nothing and should have
been sent back to its room for further deliberation and further instructed, if necessary. It is
my opinion that the judgment in this case had
no verdict upon which to stand, and I would
so treat it".

Michels v. Boureta (Tex.), 122 SW(2) 216 involves damages to a tombstone. No recovery was
allowed in this case for mental pain and anguish,
Texas being a jurisdiction which refuses to grant
same in cases involving damages to tombstones or
desecration of graveyards, where the defendant was
negligent and had not acted wilfully.
In the instant case, a legal right of respondent's
was violated, and for this reason he is entitled to
damages, the court allowing damages for mental pain
and suffering as an element of general damages, since
they were the direct, proximate and natural results
of the wrongful act.
POINT III.
IT IS WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE
TRIAL COURT TO RE-OPEN THE CASE.

The appellants in their argument, Point III, assert
the court should not have re-opened the case at the
conclusion of the evidence in chief, and should have
granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The record
(R. 124) shows that the court re-opened on its own
motion for the purpose of inquiring into facts that
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the court deemed necessary to know in order to dispose of the issues in the case.
This is a well-recognized right of the trial judge,
it being considered that he may re-open in the furtherance of the interests of justice, even though the
parties have restedr
53 Am. J ur., page 109, Sec. 123.
POINT IV.
THE COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES WAS FAIR
AND PROPER.

The judgment (R. 10) allowed the plaintiff to
recover against the defendants the sum of $250.00, and
allowed the defendants a setoff on their counterclaim
in the amount of $64.96, leaving a net money judgment
in favor of the plaintiff of $185.04. The court found,
in its finding No. 7 (R. 8), that the actions of the
defendants were unlawful. The court further found,
in its finding No. 8, that the defendants caused the
plaintiff great mental anguish and suffering, and that
he was greatly embarrass.ed. The record indicates
that· the plaintiff was forced to find lodgings in a hotel
at a late hour of the evening, when he was dressed
only in a T shirt and Levi's and was not prepared
to appear in public (R. 121). He was also forced to
spend one night sleeping on the floor at his mother's
home, and it was not until his mother had taken over
that part of the house that she had been renting that
he was again settled ( R. 58).
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It appears to this writer that the trial court was
rn a position to weigh these circumstances, and that
the award of damages was small enough under the
circumstances.
The respondents, in their brief on pages 29 and
30, refer to four cases to substantiate their point
that the court's award of damages was excessive. An
examination of these cases discloses that they failed
to uphold the respondents' point of view.
In Robinson v. Bonhaye (La., 1940), 195 So. 365,
the defendant filed no answer and was not represented
at the trial. The trial court gave a judgment for the
defendant. In his reasons for judgment, the trial
judge said:
''The court, after hearing this matter and
seeing the witnesses, is not in a position to fix
the amount to be rendered, if any amount
should be set''.
On appeal the defendant and appellee was again unrepresented, but the appellate court did award damages.
In Holmes v. DiLeo (La., 1938), 184
plaintiff alleged he was out of possession
and often had to sleep in a chair. In
$250.00 judgment to $25.00, the appellate

So. 35'6, the
for 25 days
reducing a
court said:

''All in all, we think the circumstances most
suspicious and we doubt whether an ejected
tenant would have remained quiescent under the
circumstances. It seems certain he would have
vehemently protested his efforts to see him
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until the matter might be adjusted. Nevertheless, we find it impossible to see that the finding
of the court below was manifestly erroneous''.
It appears that the lower court was upheld, but being
suspicious of the whole action, and especially eyeing
the plaintiff with suspicion, and perhaps agreeing with
the defendant that the whole business was started by
the plaintiff "in order to form the basis for a claim
for damages", the appellate court reduced the damages.
Respondents cite Rammell v. Bulen (Ohio, 1948),
80 NE (2) 167, as an example of an appellate court
returning a case for a new trial because of the excessive damages. A reading of the case shows that this
is not so. In this case a jury brought in a verdict
for $1,000.00 in favor of the plaintiff. The trial court,
after denying a motion for a new trial, did sustain a
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
and it was from this judgment that the appeal was
taken. The appellate court felt that the facts of the
case presented a jury question which, if true, would
have constituted an infringement upon plaintiff's right8.
The case was sent back with instructions to the trial
court to pass upon the motion for a new trial which
had been filed but never passed upon.
The case of Bradford v. Magana (La., 1942), 6
So. (2) 162, apparently deals with some type of flophouse and not in point here.
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For these reasons, the judgment in favor of the
respondent should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM S. FRANK
Attorney for Plaintiff
mnd Respondent
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
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